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DOMESTICITY AND THE TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
SYSTEM
BY LAUREN F. REDMAN
Forty percent of American women live in poverty after
divorce.' One explanation for this sobering statistic is that women,
as the primary caregivers in American society, are not adequately
compensated at the time of divorce for their non-economic
contributions to the family.2 These contributions directly enhance
the earning capacity of the other spouse. This paper will examine
the issue as it is framed by Joan Williams in her book Unbending
Gender, and consider the issue in the context of the Texas
community property system. Specifically, this paper will address
whether the Texas community property system, which was
designed to be in direct opposition to the common law coverture
system, insulates women from the problems Williams claims are
inherent in domesticity. To answer this question, Part I will
define domesticity and summarize Williams' argument. Part II
will provide an overview of the history of the community property
system in Texas. Finally, Part III will examine statutes and cases
in three areas of Texas family law that are used by divorce courts
to divide a couple's property and settle their future financial
obligations to one another. I will show through the statutes and
cases that domesticity is alive and well in Texas. This is an idea
that has not been addressed to date by any journal articles or
surveys, and this paper stands as a call for future inquiry into this
area.
I JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 3 (2000). Compare CARMEN DENARAS et al.,
INCOME, POVERTY, and HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE in the UNITED STATES
(2006) (indicating an overall United States poverty rate of 12.6%),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60231 .pdf.
2 The terms "carework" and "caregiving" refer to non-economic contributions of
a spouse made for the benefit of the family.
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I. JOAN WILLIAMS AND DOMESTICITY
In Unbending Gender, Joan Williams issues a call to action
in three areas.3 This paper will analyze Williams' second call to
action for elimination of the ideal worker norm in family
entitlements4 in the context of the Texas community property
system. Williams' argument is that the family entitlement system
perpetuates the coverture system. 5 The doctrine of coverture was
historically part of the common law, and defined all family
property as belonging to the husband.6  Williams argues that
coverture, though long dead in principle, is still at present in
American common law courts, since divorce courts treat the
"ideal-worker's wage as his sole personal property."
7
According to Williams, an "ideal-worker" is one that
"works full time and overtime and takes little or no time off for
childbearing or childrearing." 8  Williams gives a name to the
phenomenon of an ideal-worker's wage as his own property-
domesticity. According to Williams, domesticity has two defining
characteristics. "The first is its organization of market work around
the ideal-worker." 9 This system effectively shuts caregivers out of
social roles that "offer responsibility and authority." 10 The second
characteristic is the marginalization of caregivers, who are
primarily women." Caregivers are marginalized in this system
because by providing carework to their families, they enable their
spouses to function as ideal-workers, increasing the ideal-workers'
3 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 4. Williams calls for eliminating the norm of the
ideal-worker in the marketplace and in family entitlements, and changing the
manners in which gender is discussed. Id.
4 "Family entitlements" refers to who is entitled to the income of the ideal
worker.
5 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 115.
6id.
7id.
8 Id. at 1.
91d.
10 Id.
11 Id. See also Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall
as a Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 1 (2003) (contending
that women perform 70% to 80% of the carework in the United States).
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earning capacity, while at the same time sacrificing their own
earning capacity. Under the current system, property and alimony
are viewed as charity instead of compensation for valuable work
one spouse has contributed to the other spouse's ability to earn
money. 12 Williams believes this system unfair, and envisions a
system where family entitlements upon divorce consider and
compensate a spouse for her past and continuing contribution to
her husband's status as an "ideal-worker". 13 Williams' ideal serves
as my yardstick for measuring whether the Texas community
property system, through property division, maintenance and child
support obligations, continues to marginalize women's non-
economic contributions to the family.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE TEXAS
COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
Community property systems historically rejected the
doctrine of coverture. Community property is a system by which
whatever is earned during the marriage by the husband or the wife
is jointly owned by both of them. The theory behind the system is
that both spouses are contributing to the "community" effort of
providing for a family. 14 It is based on the separate identity of
spouses, which is in stark contrast to the "legal unity" theory under
coverture. 15  Texas has expressly embraced the community
property system. 16
The history of the community property system in Texas is a
useful starting point in evaluating whether the system adequately
protects the interest of non-ideal workers post divorce. Texas has
been praised for having a property system that emphasizes the
equality of men and women; however, that same equality is a
12 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 120-22.
1" Id. at 125-26.
14 WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR. & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN
THE UNITED STATES 4 (6th ed. 2004).
15 Id. at 6. The legal unity theory treats a husband and wife as one person for
legal purposes. Legally, the husband is that one person.16 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
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byproduct of a system that did not view women as equals. 17 The
origin of the community property system in Texas is the Spanish
Civil Law system in which women were categorized with infants
and idiots as persons in need of special protection.' 8 The purpose
of the community property system was to protect a woman's
separate property from her husband's creditor, not to create
community property for the benefit of a dependant spouse. 9 I will
look at three parts of the Texas Family Code to analyze whether
the community property system in Texas is working in regard to
eliminating the effects of domesticity post divorce. I have chosen
these areas because they are the primary provisions of the family
code that work together to impact the financial status of women
after divorce.
III. THE TEXAS COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM IN ACTION
A. PROPERTY DIVISION
1. THE CODE
Under the Texas Property Code, community property is
defined as any property, not separate property, obtained by either
spouse during the marriage. During the marriage, spouses jointly
own all community property in equal shares. Separate property is
defined as property owned by a spouse before marriage; property
acquired during the marriage by gift, devise, or descent; or
personal injury recovery (except recovery for lost wages). 2' Upon
divorce, a judge must divide the community property between the
spouses in a "just and right" manner, having due regard for the
rights of each party and any children of the marriage. 22 Just and
right division does not necessarily mean a 50/50 split, and the case
17 See Bea Ann Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed
Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REv. 689, 699 (1990).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 701-02.
20 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (Vernon 2005).
21 Id. at § 3.001.
22 Id. at § 7.001.
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law shows that property awards are often unequal.23 Community
debts are also subject to just and right division.
2. THE CASES
Texas cases provide guidance as to whether courts in
practice diverge from an equal split of community property and
community debt, and if so, what factors courts use to make a
determination as to property division. Goren v. Goren24 is a case
that illustrates a fairly common unequal distribution. In Goren, the
husband was a medical doctor and the wife a dental hygienist. The
Gorens had one child, and Mrs. Goren worked part time after the
child's birth. The court divided the assets somewhat equally, while
obligating the husband to pay back all of the debts, holding that the
husband was in a better position to pay back the debts. It is
unusual but not unheard of to see property divisions awarding one
spouse over 70% of the community property. 25  What is clear,
however, is that to make such a disproportionate award, the court
must state in its decision grounds it relied on in making the
award.
26
Many factors must be considered in order to make a just
and right division. The leading case on factors a court may use to
determine what constitutes a just and right division is Murfif v.
Murff27 They are as follows (note that most are related to the
parties' relative economic status):
1. Spouses' capacities and abilities
2. Benefits which the party not at fault would have
derived from continuation of the marriage (note
that circuits are split, and the Texas Supreme
21 See infra § III.A.2.
2' 531 S.W.2d 897 (1975).
25 See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 65 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Faram v.
Gervitz-Faram, 895 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995); Golias v. Golias, 861
S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
26 See Osorno v. Osorno, 76 S.W.3d 509 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
27 615 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1981).
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Court has not considered whether fault can be
considered in a no-fault divorce)28
3. Business opportunities of both spouses
4. Education of the spouses
5. Relative physical condition of both spouses
6. Relative financial condition and obligations of
both spouses
7. Disparity of Ages
8. Size of separate estates
9. Nature of the community property to be divided
Several other factors can be considered, such as the support needs
of an adult disabled child.29 In addition, a recent statutory change
allows the court to consider the tax attributes of property when
making a just and right division.
30
Texas follows the majority approach of American states in
specifying that occupational licenses and professional degrees are
not property divisible upon divorce. The rationale behind this rule
is that their value is inextricably intertwined with a person's skills
or learning capabilities. 31 The leading Texas case is Nail v. Nail.
32
In this case, the goodwill value of the husband's medical practice
was not subject to division, despite the fact that a businessperson is
entitled to sell his or her business goodwill under Texas law.
33
28 See Eikenhorst v. Eikenhorst, 746 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding
fault could be considered in a no-fault divorce where the husband made over
$250,000 per year, while the wife made $10 per hour as a nurse and the husband
was at fault for the breakup of the marriage). But see Phillips v. Phillips, 75
S.W.3d 564 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002) (holding fault could not be considered in a no-
fault divorce when dividing property). Until the Texas Supreme Court resolves
this issue, it is important that a divorce attorney plead both fault and no fault
9 ounds.
Young v. Young, 609 S.W.2d 758 (1980) (upholding a trial court award of
70% of the community property to a mother caring for the couple's adult
disabled child).
30 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 7.008 (Vernon 2005).
31 See N.Y.D.R.L. § 236(5)(d)(6) (2003) (providing for contributions to a
spouse's career or career potential).
486 S.W.2d 761 (1972).
33 Id. at 763.
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There were no liquid assets of the community estate, 34 and Dr. Nail
was at fault in causing the breakup of the marriage.
35
3. WHAT IS WORKING AND WHAT IS NOT
At first glance, it might seem that the Texas community
property system protects the interests of women after divorce by
recognizing that efforts of the non-ideal worker during the
marriage are a contribution to the community. The willingness of
courts to depart from a 50/50 split of community property supports
the idea that the community property system benefits women post-
divorce. Factors for the court to consider when making a just and
right division, such as disparity in income or earning capacities,
different business opportunities, different educational
achievements and children suggest that courts are cognizant of the
plight of spouses who have not been ideal workers. However, this
system provides very little help in situations where all the couple
has is the family home (usually heavily mortgaged) and
community obligations, and the court refuses to divide the only
real asset-future earnings of the ideal worker spouse. This is the
reality for many Texas families. When equity in the home is the
only asset to be divided, the house may have to be sold so that both
parties can get their share of the just and right division. According
to Joan Williams, the mother and children must often move out of
the home and into a house or apartment in "cheaper
neighborhoods.- 36 This increases the chance that children will be
moved to a worse school district and will leave established
networks of friends during a time when they are at their most
vulnerable. 37 In today's world in which the only real asset in a
marriage being the ideal worker's ability to earn an income,
property division that refuses to divide future earnings is not
adequately acknowledging the non-ideal worker's plight.
34 Id. at 762.
3 Id. at 761.
36 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 121.
37 Id. at 121.
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B. ALIMONY TEXAS STYLE-LIMITED SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
1. THE CODE
Historically, the Texas legislature refused to implement a
system of alimony reasoning that it would be inconsistent with the
community property system. The rationale for this rule was that
one of the purposes of the community system is to protect separate
property. Future earnings are considered to be separate property.
Alimony is the award of future earnings from one spouse to
another. Since Texas courts were forbidden from dividing separate
property, they could not order alimony. For years Texas was the
only state in the country without some form of alimony.3" In 1995,
the Texas legislature passed a restricted form of alimony-limited
spousal maintenance. 39 This new legislation came on the heels of
welfare reform sweeping the country. The limited spousal
maintenance law was enacted in Texas to prevent newly divorced
spouses from resorting to government welfare. However, the
statutes were enacted to operate very narrowly.
Two classes of people can receive limited spousal
maintenance. First, family violence victims are eligible.40 Second,
persons who cannot support themselves and have been married for
at least ten years are eligible. There are three acceptable reasons
for inability to support oneself: incapacitating physical or mental
disability, custodial status of child of the marriage of any age that
has a physical or mental disability that keeps the custodial parent
from being able to work outside the home, or inability to earn
enough to meet his or her basic needs in the labor market. The
maintenance is allowed for the shortest time necessary to facilitate
38 There were three exceptions to the "no alimony" rule: temporary support See
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.502(2) (Vernon 2005), contractual alimony and in
rem periodic payments.
" TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.051-8.057 (Vernon 2005). Note the Texas
legislature does not call it alimony.
40 The perpetrator of family violence must have been convicted of or received
deferred adjudication for an act of family violence under Title 4 within two
years before filing for divorce. See id at § 8.05 1(1). Note that persons eligible
under this section are not subject to the same limitations that apply to the second
category of potential limited spousal maintenance recipients.
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(5) the ability of the spouse from whom
maintenance is requested to meet that spouse's
personal needs and to provide periodic child support
payments, if applicable, while meeting the personal
needs of the spouse seeking maintenance;
(6) acts by either spouse resulting in excessive or
abnormal expenditures or other property held in
common;
(7) the comparative financial resources of the
spouses, including medical, retirement, insurance,
or other benefits, and the separate property of each
spouse;
(8) the contribution by one spouse to the education,
training, or increased earning power of the other
spouse;
(9) the property brought to the marriage by either
spouse;
(10) the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(11) marital misconduct of the spouse seeking
maintenance; and
(12) the efforts of the spouse seeking maintenance
to pursue available employment counseling as
provided by Chapter 304, Labor Code.
2. THE CASES
In general, courts have been strict in applying the criteria
for eligibility to receive temporary spousal maintenance. For
example, in Butler v. Butler,43 the court was clear that an award of
future earnings of a spouse was not allowed, holding that the wife
was not entitled to half of her husband's future earnings as a
psychological counselor. Exceptions have also been construed
very narrowly. In Carlin v. Carlin,44 a woman with extensive
3975 S.W.2d 765 (1998) (holding that future earnings are separate property).
See also Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 142 (holding that the court
does not have the power to divest separate property of one spouse and award it
to the other).
4492 S.W.3d 902 (2002).
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the spouse seeking maintenance to find a job or get the education
necessary to support himself or herself, but in no event longer than
three years.41  The amount of maintenance is an additional
limitation. The statutory maximum is the lesser of $2500 per
month or 20% of the obligor spouse's average monthly gross
income.42 Finally, there is a presumption that maintenance is not
warranted unless the spouse seeking maintenance has exercised
due diligence in seeking suitable employment or developing skills
to become self-sufficient. The Family Code lists factors to be used
in determining the amount and duration of maintenance. This list
is extensive, but important in the context of the community
property system and domesticity:
(1) the financial resources of the spouse seeking
maintenance, including the community and separate
property and liabilities apportioned to that spouse in
the dissolution proceeding, and that spouse's ability
to meet the spouse's needs independently;
(2) the education and employment skills of the
spouses, the time necessary to acquire sufficient
education or training to enable the spouse seeking
maintenance to find appropriate employment, the
availability of that education or training, and the
feasibility of that education or training;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the age, employment history, earning ability,
and physical and emotional condition of the spouse
seeking maintenance;
41 Id. at § 8.054. There are two exceptions to the absolute three-year bar. The
first exception can be invoked if a spouse is unable to support him or herself
because he or she has an incapacitating physical or mental disability. The
second can be used if a child of the marriage of any age has a physical or mental
disability that requires the spouse to care for that child instead of working. In
both of these circumstances, support can continue only for as long as the
disability continues to prevent the spouse seeking maintenance from working.
Courts have strictly interpreted this requirement.
42 Id. at § 8.055. Note that disability income, social security payments and
workman's compensation payments cannot be used to calculate the average
monthly gross income of the obligor spouse.
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medical problems that inhibited her ability to work was denied
indefinite maintenance. Courts have, however, been more
generous in awarding temporary spousal maintenance in one
particular area--cases where the requesting party was desirous of
furthering his or her education. A survey of Texas appellate
decisions revealed appellate courts upholding awards of temporary
spousal maintenance in all challenged cases where the award was
for the purpose of education. 45  This is in line with the legislative
purpose behind limited s 9ousal maintenance.
4 6  For example, in
Alexander v. Alexander,' the court awarded maintenance to a
woman who, by agreement with her spouse, stayed home with her
children instead of pursuing her education. As a result, she was
only able to find jobs paying the minimum wage. 
In In re Hale,48
the court held that an award of maintenance was appropriate where
the wife had married at fifteen, did not graduate from high school,
and was hindered by her husband in her efforts to get an education
during the marriage. The court also held that the fact that the wife
was able to get a minimum wage job would not hinder her from
receiving maintenance. The court held that there is no
45 See, e.g., In Re Marriage of McFarland, 176 S.W. 3d 650 (2005) (wife
awarded limited spousal maintenance and needed money to go back to school);
Alaghehband v. Abolbaghaei, 2003 WL 1986777 (2003) (granting an Iranian
wife maintenance despite the fact she had an accounting degree from a foreign
country. Maintenance was granted to allow her to obtain a marketing degree and
English language skills); Trueheart v. Trueheart, 2003 WL 22176626 (2003)
(upholding an award of limited spousal maintenance where housewife of 21
years had no job skills and needed at least three years of job training to support
herself); Matter of the Marriage of Goodfellow, 2002 WL 31769028 (2002)
(upholding an award of limited spousal maintenance for two years to allow wife
to develop her education; Morris v. Morris, 2001 WL 257809 (2001) (granting
an award of spousal maintenance where a wife desired to take coding classes
over a two-year period to become a medical coding specialist); Alexander v.
Alexander, 982 S.W.2d 116 (1998) (discussed below); Hale v. Hale, 975 S.W.2d
116 (1998) (discussed below).
46 O'Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 533 (2002) (stating that the "legislative
purpose in enacting provisions for spousal maintenance was to provide
temporary and rehabilitative support for a spouse whose ability for self-support
was lacking or has deteriorated over time while engaged in homemaking
activities").
47 982 S.W.2d 116 (1998).
48 975 S.W.2d 694 (1998).
BUFFALO WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL.
presumption that the minimum wage is sufficient to meet a party's
minimum reasonable needs. The court also articulated the factors
from § 8.052 to be used in determining maintenance.
3. WHAT IS WORKING AND WHAT IS NOT
The move from no alimony to limited spousal maintenance
is a move in the right direction. However, there are two
fundamental problems with this system. First, it excludes far too
many people with its strict statutory eligibility requirements. For
example, in the absence of a showing of recent family violence, the
parties must have been married for ten years. This leaves out
scores of women who have become marginalized for the greater
good of the family, only to find themselves empty-handed and
alone after a failed marriage. The strict durational limit may not
adequately compensate a woman for the permanent loss of
productivity, which her marginalization has cost her.49  An
additional problem with the system of limited spousal maintenance
is that it is a system based on need rather than entitlement.
50
Maintenance requirements, like alimony payments, are designed to
minimize intrusion into the husband's lifestyle.51
B. CHILD SUPPORT IN THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
4. THE CODE
At first glance, it would seem that the child support system
in Texas has nothing to do with community property. Yet, the long
shadow cast by the principle of not awarding separate property in
the form of future earnings reaches the support of children. Texas
child support guidelines impose a payment that is a percentage of
the non-custodial parent's disposable income up to the first
$6000.52 Above that amount, the party seeking support must prove
49 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 127 (estimating that a woman loses 1.5% of
earning power for every year she is out of the labor market).
50 Id. at 122 (indicating that this is a problem will all alimony systems).
51 id.
52 TEx. FAM. CODE § 154.125 (Vernon 2005).
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that the child needs additional support.53 The statute reads, "(i)n
no event may the obligor be required to pay more child support
than the greater of the presumptive amount or the amount equal to
100 percent of the proven needs of the child., 54 The rationale
behind this rule is that transfers above the child's minimum needs
amount to a payment to the custodial parent, not the child, which
would amount to alimony. 55 Refusing to view maintenance as an
entitlement neglects the recognition that domesticity has increased
the ideal worker's ability to earn money.
5. THE CASES
Scott v. Younts56 is a case that illustrates Texas courts'
reluctance to award child support in excess of the proven needs of
children. The trial court had awarded the custodial parent child
support in the amount of $2500. The father claimed that the trial
court had abused its discretion in awarding this much support,
despite the fact that his monthly income was over $25,000 and the
mother had lost her job and could only find low-paying temporary
work. The mother made two lists: one containing items she was
currently spending to meet her child's needs, and the other
enumerating items she could not afford but felt her daughter
needed. The court held that the law required an award of support
above the presumptive award to be based only on the unmet needs
of the child.57 However, the needs of the child are not limited to
bare necessities of life.58 In this case, the court found that the
award of $2500 per month was not an abuse of discretion because
it was less than 100% of the proven needs of the child. 59 Included
in the determination of the child's proven needs were current
53 Id. at § 154.126.
54 Id. at § 154.126(b).
5 Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 834 S.W.2d 369, 372 (Tex. App. 1992) rev'd on
other grounds, 860 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1993). See also, Kathleen A. Hogan, The
Big Case: Issues in High Income/High Asset Cases, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM.
LAW 349, 354 (2001).
56 926 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. App. 1996).
57 Id. at 420 (citing Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 860 S.W.2d 414, 417 (Tex. 1993)).
58 Id. (citing Thomas v. Thomas, 895 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Tex. App. 1995)).
59 Id at 422.
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expenses the mother was paying, private school tuition to prepare
the child for college, counseling, books, summer camp to raise the
child's self esteem, extracurricular lessons and a maid; not
included were savings for college and a special pet. In Panozzo
v. Panozzo,61 the court held that the trial court's award of child
support over the guidelines was a breach of discretion. This is a
difficult case, however, because the husband was very wealthy, yet
refused to obey the trial court's order to produce documentation of
his income. 62  In the absence of documentation, the trial court
imposed a large support award. The court of appeals stated that
the "Code provides that when there is an absence of sufficient
evidence to determine the wages and salary income of the obligor,
it shall be presumed that the obligor has wages equal to the
prevailing federal minimum wage for a forty hour week., 63 The
court acknowledged that it would be unfair to reward the father for
his uncooperativeness and remanded for a new trial.64
6. WHAT IS WORKING AND WHAT IS NOT
Because approximately 50% of American children will at
some point in their childhoods be eligible to receive child support,
child support laws take on a vital role in making sure children have
what they need.65 Child support guidelines need to be reevaluated
to focus less on giving the non-custodial parent a "clean break"
and more on protecting children from falling into poverty after a
divorce. Because mothers are the primary caretakers
approximately 90% of the time following divorce,66 fathers
60 id.
61 904 S.W.2d (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 785. See also, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.068 (Vernon 2005).
64 See 904 S.W.2d at 787.
65 See Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation,
86 CAL. L. REV. 4, 42 (1998). This number varies by ethnicity. See also
ROBERT HAVEMAN & BARBARA WOLFE, SUCCEEDING GENERATIONS: ON THE
EFFECTS OF INVESTMENTS IN CHILDREN 19, note 2 (1994) (stating that almost
90% of African American children will live in a single parent household at some
point in their childhood).
66 WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 123.
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continue to benefit from their ex-wives care-giving work, enabling
fathers to be ideal workers. The problem with this scenario is that
the women are no longer benefiting from the ideal workers'
salaries. According to Williams,
The father in a family organized around the
dominant family ecology does not want a "clean
break" either. What he wants (and generally gets) is
the ability to take with him the career benefits he
received as a division of labor within the marriage.
The "clean break" imagery is nothing more than a
way to characterize rules that allow the husband to
walk away with this income transfer from his
former wife as the optimum in freedom for both
parties.
67
I argue that the Texas courts' refusal to order child support
that might be construed as alimony so as not to divide separate
property is just as absurd.
III. CONCLUSION
Within the Texas community property system, the concepts
of community property and just and right division do not in and of
themselves promote domesticity. The shortfall of this system of
property division is that most couples have no significant assets
other than the ability to earn income. A radical shift in the way
maintenance and child support are conceived is necessary. Both
maintenance and child support must be thought of not as welfare,
but rather entitlements that reflect the value of one spouse's past
and continuing contribution to the ability of the other spouse's
performance as an ideal worker.
67 1d. at 127.

